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Prologue: Ruminations of an Anti-Capitalist
As I write this, we are suffering through the global pandemic of COVID-19. It carries
with it an inexplicable form of befuddlement, dread, and confusion. We are witnessing the
entrenched systems of capitalism collapse into themselves as they fail to cultivate collectivist
forms of kinship, care, and understanding. This global pandemic has forced us to accept that we
cannot survive as individual and atomized beings. Even long before the pandemic, millions of
people were suffering from precarity. A precarity of employment, livelihood, and housing, along
with a frightening uncertainty for what lies in our future. This new form of 21st century
technologically-weaponized right-wing authoritarianism imposes exploitative measures against
the working-class and the environment. The ruling classes want to completely erode our ability
to imagine radical futures of love, creative human processes, and mutual care. While all these
contradictions have tragically come to the forefront, perhaps there is hope in imagining and
acting on their revolutionary potential.
There were several challenges I faced when writing this thesis. The biggest challenge was
writing on a relatively novel topic that is rapidly developing. In this current moment, the
biometric and geolocational data of millions of people are being weaponized by governments
and private companies, violating fundamental rights of privacy and strengthening punitive
measures. While a pandemic is indeed an exponentially expanding public emergency, the danger
of implementing authoritarian surveillance mechanisms, such as cameras, drones, facial
recognition, thermal imaging, and location trackers, is that they may very well become the norm.
While I develop on the topic of surveillance in the time of COVID-19 in the last portion of my
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thesis, the examples I use might be outdated by the time you read this. However, the argument I
hope to make in this thesis will remain relevant for many years to come.
The second challenge I struggled with is wanting to write literature that genuinely
agitates the status quo within the oppressive borders of academia. I write this to acknowledge the
academic and structural privilege that affords me to produce this thesis at such a critical time,
while millions of others are suffering through conditions of sickness, houselessness,
unemployment, exploitation, and at worst - death. The divide between constantly advocating to
improve the material conditions of the oppressed within the rigid institution of academia is a
cognitive dissonance difficult to grapple with. What I will say with certainty is that academia
will never liberate us. The ivory tower of academia is deeply hierarchical, with its roots
entrenched in white supremacy, patriarchy, heteronormativity, and casteism in order to serve the
Empire and consolidate the power of elites. Stuart Hall describes this tension eloquently:
But I have been reminded of this tension very forcefully in the discussions on AIDS.
AIDS is one of the questions which urgently brings before us our marginality as critical
intellectuals in making real effects in the world. And yet it has often been represented for
us in contradictory ways. Against the urgency of people dying in the streets, what in
God's name is the point of cultural studies? What is the point of the study of
representations, if there is no response to the question of what you say to someone who
wants to know if they should take a drug and if that means they'll die two days later or a
few months earlier? At that point, I think anybody who is into cultural studies seriously
as an intellectual practice, must feel, on their pulse, its ephemerality, its insubstantiality,
how little it registers, how little we've been able to change anything or get anybody to do
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anything. If you don't feel that as one tension in the work that you are doing, theory has
let you off the hook. (Hall 106)
Hall, however, is able to contextualize the nuance in understanding how academic theory -cultural studies in particular -- can analyze and advance the material conditions of struggle:
On the other hand, in the end, I don't agree with the way in which this dilemma is often
posed for us, for it is indeed a more complex and displaced question than just people
dying out there. The question of AIDS is an extremely important terrain of struggle and
contestation. In addition to the people we know who are dying, or have died, or will,
there are the many people dying who are never spoken of. How could we say that the
question of AIDS is not also a question of who gets represented and who does not? AIDS
is the site at which the advance of sexual politics is being rolled back. It's a site at which
not only people will die, but desire and pleasure will also die if certain metaphors do not
survive, or survive in the wrong way. Unless we operate in this tension, we don't know
what cultural studies can do, can't, can never do; but also, what it has to do, what it alone
has a privileged capacity to do. It has to analyze certain things about the constitutive and
political nature of representation itself, about its complexities, about the effects of
language, about textuality as a site of life and death. (Hall 106)
While the sociopolitical context in which this was written differs from the times we are in now,
the critical framework Hall describes regarding the relationship between cultural studies and the
AIDS epidemic remains relevant to any scholarship written about the realities of structural
oppression. As I write this in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Hall’s words become more
relevant than ever. Academics, students, and scholars must not be let off the hook; we must

8

actively live in this contested site of tension. We must cultivate collectivized knowledge sets and
work against the individualized and hierarchical ownership of knowledge.
This paper is the written extension of my Media Studies capstone project, created during
the fall of 2019, which centered on Chapter Two of this thesis as it focused on a more historical,
chronological, and broader understanding of surveillance in India. My goal was to make the
oftentimes dense and theoretical frameworks of surveillance more accessible to a broader
population through the creation of an interactive archival web timeline. I was inspired by digital
products such as Divide and Conquer: The Shattering of Palestinian Space by Israel (B’Tselem),
which educates people about Israeli settler-colonialism in Occupied Palestine through an
interactive map-based timeline. Through the medium of the web, I want to contribute to a
growing, underground, cultural, artistic, and philosophical digital sphere that imagines
alternative modes of media consumption in the hopes of resisting fascism, both in South Asia
and globally.
I plan to update the website continually for it to last beyond the confines, borders, and
oppressions of academia. I hope that it serves as a useful visual supplement to this thesis as well,
given that it contains various forms of multimedia that this paper does not. This includes videos,
podcasts, news articles, and testimonies of those materially impacted by surveillance in India. In
addition, the last panel on the website, “Tomorrow: Anti-Surveillance Futures”, emphasizes
anti-surveillance efforts from those affected, artists, activists, and academics. I included this to
make sure that the timeline does not merely foment nihilism about futures of mass surveillance,
but also cultivates resistance through imagining futures of anti-surveillance; in other words,
embodying a quote by Italian communist Antonio Gramsci while he was imprisoned under
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fascist rule: “Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.” The website, Dekh Rahe: An
Interactive Timeline of India’s Surveillance State in the Making (Prabhakar), can be accessed on
the web at any time.
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1. Introduction: The Significance of Surveillance Studies
In the time of both rapid technological development and rising right-wing
authoritarianism, it is important to understand the material consequences of growing regimes of
surveillance. While surveillance has existed for centuries, surveillance studies itself is a nascent
field that lacks a refined set of research methods and institutional standardization. In this section,
I provide a brief explanation for the definitions, frameworks, and concepts I will be engaging
with in this thesis. I will then apply that to the political-economic environment of India in order
to understand our historical, contemporary, and future conditions under surveillance.

a. Defining Surveillance:
Academic Christian Fuchs asserts that the limitations within the field of surveillance
studies in the social studies arise from the inconsistency of definitions, especially of the term
surveillance itself. While surveillance is often defined as any form of watching, monitoring, or
seeing, Fuchs argues that this definition assumes a misleading neutrality embedded in the act of
surveillance and an assumed necessity of surveillance in societies. Fuch suggests, instead, that
surveillance always involves economic and state control in order to enable capital accumulation
or to organize and manage populations (110). This definition of negative surveillance considers
surveillance to be “inherently connected to violence and domination” (111). Fuchs warns against
generalizing surveillance to be any form of information gathering:
If surveillance is a normalized concept of everyday language use that characterizes all
forms of information gathering, storage, and processing and not only a critical concept,
then this normative task becomes more difficult. If everything is surveillance, then there
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is no outside of surveillance left, no transcendental humanistic sphere, idea, or subject
that allows to express discontent coercive information gathering and the connected
human rights violations. (127)
Fuchs argues that neutral definitions of surveillance would make the discipline of surveillance
studies itself obsolete, which is why it is important to define it negatively. In this thesis, I deploy
Fuch’s understanding of surveillance: “a specific kind of information gathering, storage,
processing, assessment, and use that involves potential or actual harm, coercion, violence,
asymmetric power relations, control, manipulation, domination, disciplinary power” (127). As
long as our material realities are governed by capitalism and other interlocking systems of
domination,1 surveillance will inherit their logic of violence and inequality.
The growing importance of surveillance studies and activism is the result of critical
feminist, Dalit-Bahujan, Black, Indigenous, anti-racist, anti-imperialist, and Marxist
interventions that center the targeted violence of surveillance on marginalized communities: “the
collection of data on individuals or groups that are used so that control and discipline of behavior
can be exercised by the threat of being targeted by violence” (Fuchs 122). I am specifically
influenced by Simone Browne’s book, Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness, i n which
she introduces the interrelated frameworks of racializing surveillance and dark sousveillance,
placing surveillance studies in conversation with Black feminist theory and the histories of
transatlantic slavery (12). I am also influenced by Dubrofsky and Magnet’s anthology Feminist
Surveillance Studies, w
 hich expands on bell hooks’ notion of “white supremacy capitalist
1

I borrow the term “interlocking systems of domination” from Professor Phyllis Jackson at Pomona College. It
serves as an alternative to “interlocking systems of oppression” as it is meant to put emphasis on the systems that
cause oppression rather than reinforcing oppression itself. In the context of this paper, I include the systems of
capitalism, imperialism, heteropatriarchy, transphobia, caste supremacy, white supremacy, and Hindu fascism, etc.
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patriarchy” to suggest the term: “white supremacist capitalist heteropatriarchal surveillance”,
defined as “the use of surveillance practices and technologies to normalize and maintain
whiteness, able-bodiedness, capitalism, and heterosexuality, practices integral to the modern
state” (7). Although these two works center the United States in its context of analysis, these
pivotal Black feminist interventions in the field of surveillance studies have greatly helped me
frame similar frameworks of surveillance in the nation-state of India, which I will begin to talk
about in the subsequent sections.

b. Surveillance Studies in India:
United States (U.S.) academia saw a growth of work in the field of surveillance studies
following the launch of the War on Terror in 2001, described as the “post 9/11 new imperialism”
(Fuchs 110), and the subsequent whistleblowing revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013. Mass
surveillance serves to justify the United States’ increasing wave of imperial aggression on the
Global South,2 with a pre-emptive model of criminality or suspected terrorism, neoliberal
regimes of security, and racialized forms of securitization and militarization. This has functioned
(and continues to function) domestically through targeted racialized state surveillance of Muslim
communities and Black radicals by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
transnationally, through the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) covert surveillance endeavors
abroad to aid intervention and invasion of countries in the Global South.
While the U.S. has seen this important growth, there remains a major dearth of the same
kind of work in India -- and generally in the Global South -- despite the growing wave of

2

Although there are several different definitions, I define the “Global South” as the regions of Latin America, Asia,
and Africa. More specifically, the term is employed in a post-colonial sense to describe previously colonized spaces
and peoples subjugated under contemporary neo-colonialism, imperialism, and capitalist globalization.
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right-wing authoritarianism that has used surveillance as a means to their biopolitical ends.
Right-wing governments in countries such as India, Israel (Occupied Palestine), the Philippines,
Brazil, and more, are being aided by Western neoliberal forces. This occurs through direct
governmental political alliances and through the transnational flow of global capital which
regularly imports and exports the production of surveillance and weapons’ apparati through the
military-industrial complex. As policy analyst Udbhav Tiwari explains, the lack of scholarship
about surveillance in India also derives from the lack of legislative transparency and journalistic
coverage of India’s surveillance regimes. While there has been a rising amount of discourse on
surveillance in India following the emergence of the Unique Identification Authority of India’s
(UIDAI) Aadhaar in 2009, this discourse must be placed in a wider historical context as
surveillance regimes are a facet of any colonial, neocolonial, or neoliberal paradigm; surveillance
is not specific to the 21st century. Furthermore, the consequences of surveillance must be
analyzed through the intersections of class, caste, gender, sexuality, and religion, as they exert
their power over the most marginalized in Indian society. While these fields of study and
activism exist disparately, their convergence is rare, but deeply necessary as surveillance
technologies and Hindu fascism continue to extend their reach and domination over all facets of
everyday life.
Part of this thesis seeks to understand the historical conditions that rendered the
nation-state of India as having the world’s largest biometric surveillance system: Aadhaar.
Surveillance practices used by the British Raj were created to exert sovereign power, uphold
eugenicist values of white supremacy, and suppress anti-colonial dissent, which mirrors the
current social order of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), as they use surveillance to similar
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ends in today’s political economy. As of 2020, the BJP, the Hindu supremacist ruling body, has
successfully harvested the biometric (fingerprints, iris scans, and facial recognition) and
biographical (name, age, gender, and address) data of over 1.2 billion people in a centralized
database (“India’s Biometric ID System”). India’s current surveillance regimes champion
biopolitical control through cultivating surveillant assemblages through the biometric data
harvested by Aadhaar, which has reduced flesh to pure information and created a data double
(Haggerty and Ericson 613), a concept I will expand upon in Chapter Three. Contrary to claims
that Aadhaar was created to empower the poor through providing identification by the Indian
nation-state, I argue that these surveillance regimes are actually fundamentally oppressive; they
are used to uphold caste purity, control and coerce marginalized bodies, and anticipate, suppress,
and punish dissent against the Indian nation-state.
In the book Right to Maim, scholar Jasbir Puar draws upon Michel Foucault’s
foundational formulation of biopolitics, which is defined as population measures enacted by the
state which enable some forms of living and inhibit others: “birth rates, fertility, longevity,
disease, impairment, toxicity, productivity” (xviii).3 Puar builds on this to understand how
“biopolitics deployed through its neoliberal guises is a capacitation machine”. Within the Indian
context, Aadhaar can too be considered a capacitation machine, as it is guised as a way to
empower the poor through a biometric identification system, but instead, results in “capacitation
for some...and the debilitation of many others” (xviii). Surveillance is not a passive force of
monitoring, it is also actively enforcing behaviors and identities through coercion. While Puar’s
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Puar’s book, “Right to Maim”, focuses on the Israeli occupation of Palestine and their tactic of debilitating Palestinians for
biopolitical control. While the context differs from that of India, it is worth mentioning how Israel has embraced sophisticated
surveillance regimes to uphold their settler-colonial foundations in order to oppress Palestinians. Israel has a similar database of
citizens’ biometric data and regularly uses facial recognition technologies at their checkpoints.
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work focuses on the context of the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the United States, it also
applies to any neoliberal environment in which surveillance is not only responsive and
repressive, but also pre-emptive and productive. Aadhaar is a means to achieve biopolitical
control over a civilian population of 1.2 billion people through extracting their biometric data,
along with a means to achieve necropolitical control over those who fail to assimilate to the
biometric assemblage and are left to suffer and die as they are disposable to the nation-state.
These processes are informed by values of Brahmanical hegemony, capitalism, Hindu
supremacy, and patriarchy.
While this outlines a general framework for the evolution of surveillance, what makes
India’s condition unique is the ways in which the ethno-nationalist project of Hindu nationalism
has coincided with the neoliberal landscape of India and its claim to a ‘secular democracy’. Israel
and India are often compared for their ethno-nationalist projects of Zionism and Hindutva. While
they indeed are similar ideologically, Israel specifically defines itself as “the national home of
the Jewish people”, while India, in the first portion of its Constitution, defines itself as a
“sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic”. The rise of Hindu nationalism, however, as a
grotesquely intolerant and violent right-wing project of ethno-nationalism, contradicts this
fundamental clause of the Constitution, as it ceases to incorporate the values of secularism and
democracy. Additionally, it is important to consider how neoliberalism in India rose with the tide
of Hindutva. Wendy Brown defines neoliberalism as the "ensemble of economic policies in
accord with its root principle of affirming free markets” (28). Globalization is often seen as the
natural result of neoliberalism, as cultural and capital flow across borders, facilitate greater
tolerance and thus, lead to stronger democracies. Ever since the economic liberalization of
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India’s economy in 1991, India has similarly championed neoliberalism and has emerged as the
third largest economy in the world. This begs the question of how the ethno-nationalist project of
Hindutva, championed by the current BJP, is able to co-exist with neoliberal globalization. While
this presents itself as a paradox, upon closer examination we can see how the projects of
Hindutva and neoliberalism work in a synergy in the 21st century.
Wendy Brown describes several features of the effects of neoliberalism, which includes
intensified inequality, unethical commercialization, and the ever-growing intimacy of corporate
and finance capital with the state. Within neoliberalism, the “top strata acquires and retains even
more wealth and the very bottom is literally turned out on the streets or into the growing urban
and suburban slums of the world” (28). This is especially true in India where 1% of the
population owns 58.4% of the total wealth and over 800 million Indians are living below the
poverty line. As Amir Hussain notes,
It is interesting to note that the global reach of the neoliberal economic order coincides
with the rise of extremists as the political saviours of the free market. India is a basket
case of correlations between economic liberalisation, political extremism and cultural
homogenisation. There is a well-entrenched political insanity propagated through Modi’s
doctrine of transforming a secular India into a Hindu Rashtra that is supported by the
corporate world. The reunion of the clergy, the government and the economy marks a
new phase of global capitalism that plays havoc with the poor in the developing world by
helping fascists assume power as both chauvinist consumers and brand leaders.
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Hindutva and neoliberalism do not contradict each other; they work in a synergy in which
Hindutva protects corporate interests and the violent structures of Hindu fascism and capitalism
work to oppress the working-class, religious minorities, and the caste oppressed, categories
which are likely to overlap. This rise of both Hindutva and neoliberalism in India has allowed the
government to use digital technologies, the result of global trade, for their surveillance regimes.
These regimes inherit the violent oppressions of both those systems, often in tandem, as
explained through this thesis.

c. Structure of the thesis:
In Chapter Two, I begin with a historical analysis of surveillance regimes in India.4 I start
in the 1800s under the colonial rule of the British Raj and describe the development of
surveillance laws and systems. This includes the Indian Telegraph Law of 1885, which gave the
British the power to anticipate and crack down on anti-colonial dissent, along with burgeoning
analog biometric technologies, such as fingerprinting, which was invented to manage imprisoned
populations; an institutional precedent for India’s current-day biometric system of Aadhaar.
Next, I move forward to the Partition of India in 1947, which I argue is an incredibly crucial
point in history that, in many ways, defined facets of surveillance today. Through the forced
displacement of millions of people and imposed divisions on the basis of religion, this period
forged new subjectivities and definitions of citizenship, which were intimately linked to
biometric data and the verification of identity in relation to the Indian nation-state. Next, I
describe the ascension of the Hindu nationalist movement, also called Hindutva, following the

4

Some references to India, in this section, refer to the borders of the Indian nation-state prior to 1947 (Partition).
Pre-1947 India included current-day India, current-day Pakistan, and current-day Bangladesh.
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Partition. I describe the ways the ruling Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, has successfully
championed these systems of biometric surveillance and classification. While I mark the
similarities of surveillance structures from colonialism to now, I also note the discontinuities; the
shift from analog surveillance technologies during colonialism to digital surveillance
technologies in our present-day neoliberal environment. These forms of surveillance have been
used to enforce violent registries, such as the National Registry of Citizens (NRC). Finally, I
argue that the biometric surveillance state is predicated on caste supremacy, as it enforces ideas
of biovalue, which are intimately tied to notions of the purity and cleanliness of an individual,
and thus, intimately tied to caste supremacy.
In Chapter Three, I look at biometric surveillance more closely. I describe the emergence
of Aadhaar, the world’s largest biometric system in the world. Through biometrics, the body
becomes a source of data in order to verify identity. I briefly examine the functionings, rationale,
and political propaganda associated with Aadhaar through Modi’s ‘Digital India’, which has
created a technological hubris that assumes biometrics to be a foolproof method of efficiency and
identification, despite numerous case studies that amplify its failure. Surveillance functions
through class divides; while privacy concerns are at the center of dissent to Aadhaar by the
Indian middle-class, for the working-class and poor, Aadhaar has necropolitical implications; a
more grave question of life or death. The coercive nature of Aadhaar, through its function creep,
has caused the elderly, caste oppressed, queer and trans communities, women, and disabled
people to materially suffer from hunger, the lack of education, the lack of pensions, the lack of
medical services, and at worst, death. Finally, I describe how Aadhaar has propelled a merging
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of state and corporate power, mirroring the historical relationship between Nazi Germany and
International Business Machines (IBM) to create punch cards for census data.
In Chapter Four, I examine the proliferation of drone surveillance, specifically taking the
case study of the anti-CAA protests that began in December of 2019. Using Chamayou’s
theorization on drone logics, I explain the broader assemblage that is posed by both the biometric
surveillance system of Aadhaar and drone surveillance. I begin with analyzing the Indian state’s
drone usage in 2013 over Naxalite areas in Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh, and Odisha, as part of
Operation Green Hunt, showing how surveillance facilitates state-sanctioned violence against
Adivasis and communists. I then describe how drone surveillance has reified Islamophobia,
drawing from examples from the Muslim pogroms in Delhi that took place in 2014 and 2020. I
then turn to the present-day usage of drones, as they are now being used to track, surveil, and
control protesters during protests. Facial recognition technologies developed for Aadhaar are
being used through drone surveillance to identify protesters and arrest and charge them under
specific acts, despite several Indian laws and regulations the police departments are in violation
of that outlaw the use of specific models of drones. When paired with Aadhaar, drone
surveillance can significantly alter the material conditions of protesters, who are overwhelmingly
Muslims and specifically, Muslim women.
In the last chapter, Chapter Five, I use Steve Mann’s Veillance Plane to develop a praxis
for anti-surveillance using the concept of sousveillance, and applying that to case studies from
the anti-CAA protests. I then discuss how capitalist societies inherently cultivate a value-set of
individualism and mistrust, placing surveillance and societies of domination at the center of our
existence. In order to move towards a praxis of anti-surveillance, we must move towards the
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socialist values of collectivism, solidarity, trust, and honesty. This has been fought for through
protests and social movements against Aadhaar in recent years, mostly led by labourers, farmers,
and students. The chapter ends by highlighting grassroots anti-surveillance work being done by
feminist, environmental, and digital security organizations in India and in the diaspora.
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2. Historical Analysis: Lineage of Surveillance in Colonial and Post-Colonial India
Sociologist Max Weber explains that the formation of the modern nation-state is defined
in terms of its monopoly on violence: “A human community that (successfully) claims the
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (78). Through this
understanding, the state is similarly able to enact its monopoly of violence through a variety of
means, including digital technologies. This enables us to understand the evolution of surveillance
in both how it has carried over to the present from the past, but also, how it differs in its nature
and functioning.
In the introduction to The Surveillance Studies Reader, S
 ean Hier and Joshua Greenberg
note that even though “a qualitative shift in surveillance took place after 9/11”, there is a dearth
of scholarship and literature on “the pre-9/11 forms of surveillance that made post-9/11
surveillance possible” (8). Contemporary surveillance regimes are distinct from earlier forms of
colonial surveillance with the shift from analog to digital surveillance. This digital surveillance
functions through a neoliberal nexus between surveillance by the modern state and private
corporations that share both the legal and material frameworks for data collection and sharing
(Shephard 6). Foucault describes this evolution of power in terms of sovereign power and
disciplinary power. Sovereign power involves obedience to a central authority figure. Colonial
powers championed the use of analog technologies to directly subordinate and subdue.
Current-day society resembles a disciplinary society in which the neoliberal environment of
digital technologies regulates time, space, and the routine of everyday activities. Our identities
are largely governed through disciplinary means in which surveillance is exhibited through a
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variety of institutions. This shift from sovereign to disciplinary power, from analog to digital,
and from colonialism to neoliberalism, lies at the heart of how surveillance has changed from
colonial times to the present.

a. Colonial logics of surveillance:
The current surveillance state in India props up the ethno-nationalist project of Hindutva
taking influence from the vicious histories of British colonialism. Tactics of British colonial
domination in India involved the development of sophisticated surveillance tactics that
succeeded in territorial theft and acquisition in order to monitor populations and quell dissent.
Yael Berda explains how colonial bureaucracy in the occupation of the West Bank in Palestine
and India “have shaped practices and routines of classification and surveillance of civilian
populations in sites of conflict. As the technologies of population management shifted from the
colonies back to the metropole, they ensconced the administrative structures of colonial
bureaucracy” (629). While the logics of colonial surveillance have carried into the present, one
particularly significant law enacted during the time of British colonialism is the Indian Telegraph
Act of 1885, which gave the state power to intercept the communications of all civilians. During
the time of British colonialism, this emerged with the regulation of telegraphy (Acharya).
Three laws preceded the Telegraph Act of 1885, with each having an increasing amount
of power to intercept telegraph communication. This colonial-era law is still active today with
numerous amendments to account for the changes in technology. In her book In Pursuit of Proof:
A History of Identification Documents in India, T
 arangini Sriraman also strengthens the
argument that the current Indian surveillance regime, especially in the case of Aadhaar, is well
informed by colonial practices, especially within the context of the dependence of identification
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documents on biometric signifiers (54). These practices of identity-based surveillance systems
during the time of the British Raj were implemented following the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, a
rebellion that itself was thwarted due to the Telegraph Laws (the first iteration itself being
enacted in 1857), as the government was able to intercept communications regarding the
rebellion. Even as insurgents attempted to destroy the line, the state was able to consolidate
control and violently crack down on anti-colonial dissent (Headrick 51).

b. Biometric surveillance from colonialism to Partition:
Following the rebellion, Imperial Civil Service (ICS) officer Sir William Herschel,
working for the Indian Civil Service in the Bengal region, began experimenting with fingerprints
to be used for the registration of deeds and contracts, the verification of pensioners, and
carceral-related documents. The use of fingerprinting came from wanting to shift from older
methods of determining if the native body was involved in prior criminal behavior. These older
methods included tattooing, branding, and lashing criminals as external proof of prior criminal
behavior (Abraham 382). However, nineteenth-century scientists began searching for physical
signs of criminality from the ‘inside out’. Herschel passed on his research to British eugenicist
Francis Galton and Indian police officer Edward Henry. Galton used fingerprints in forensic
patterns and to curb fraudulence: “Fingerprinting would be of continual good service in our
tropical settlement, where the swarms of dark and yellow-skinned races...are grossly addicted to
personation and other varieties of fraudulent practices” (Singha 192). Henry used fingerprinting
to create an effective system for establishing identity. The Bengal police successfully created an
infrastructure that exhibited logistical consistency and easy retrieval. Most importantly, however,
was the fact that fingerprinting instilled confidence within policing bodies that impersonation
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and fraud were impossible, making colonial criminalization of the native Indian more
streamlined and successful. By the 19th century, fingerprinting became an important part of the
colonial enterprise of proving the authenticity of documentation and eliminating the potential for
Indians to escape the British carceral system. One issue, however, was that in order to identify an
Indian, their fingerprint would have to match an existing fingerprint in the system, requiring
collecting the biometric data of everyone, despite their criminal record, race, or status. The
colonial judicial system eventually decided against this because interracial mixing, even in a
registry, was not permitted. However, it showed that the biopolitical fantasy of such a system
necessitates gathering the biometric information of the whole population. This remains the
general logic of Aadhaar as we observe it today, but on a more technologically advanced scale,
and extended far wider than just the institution of the judicial system (Abraham 383).
Additionally, telegraphs and collecting fingerprints were analog practices during colonialism,
while today these forms of surveillance are proliferated through digital technologies.
The British ruled India for over 200 years, formally culminating in 1947 when the
Partition of India occurred. Orchestrated by the British, the Partition resulted in over two million
deaths and 14 million people displaced (Talbot and Singh). This unparalleled violence
fundamentally morphed the meanings of citizenship and postcolonial subjectivities. Almost 73
years later, these forged meanings of citizenship inform the means of surveillance in terms of
data accumulation about family history on behalf of the increasingly fascistic government.
Despite the vision for India to become a “secular nation”, the Partition indeed sowed the seeds
for the ascension of the Hindu right, which solidified religious animosity and communal violence
amongst Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims. What began as an anti-colonial project of nationalism in
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India quickly converged with existing strains of right-wing Hindu extremist groups, such as the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The RSS, founded in 1925, was an organization dedicated
to the idea that India is a Hindu nation and that Hindus deserved to rule over other minorities.
The RSS openly admired European fascists such as Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, inspired
by their ideologies of racial purity and ethno-nationalism. While the RSS is considered a
paramilitary extremist group, it was not until 1980 that newer members decided that Hindu
nationalism should be enveloped into the political and electoral sphere, resulting in the formation
of the Bharatiya Janata Party, which quickly gained power, ultimately leading to the election of
Narendra Modi in 2014. Modi, a longtime member of the RSS, was previously the chief minister
of the state of Gujarat.
To the Hindu Rashtra, the “Muslim” represents a demographic threat to the
ethno-nationalist agenda to create a Hindu nation-state. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, the founder
of Hindutva5, even stated in his writing, "Muslims were the real enemies, not the British, [their
ideology] posed a threat to the real nation, namely Hindu Rashtra" (Jaffrelot 112). The
pernicious and violent ideology of Hindutva has materialized in communal violence against
Muslims and caste oppressed communities, namely Dalits. This includes the 1992 demolition of
the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya by over 150,000 members of the Hindu nationalist Vishva Hindu
Parishad (VHP) and the BJP, resulting in the death of over 2,000 people in the ensuing
communal riots. Modi specifically has unleashed mass suffering in pursuit of the vision of
Hindutva, especially towards Indian Muslims. In 2002, Modi was in power as chief minister of
Gujarat and orchestrated a pogrom that killed over 2,000 Muslims, injured over 2,500, and

5

In this thesis, I use the terms Hindutva, Hindu nationalism, Hindu extremism, and Hindu fascism interchangeably.
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rendered tens of thousands of people homeless (Mishra). Since Modi was elected in 2014 and an
explicitly right-wing Hindu nationalist government has come into electoral power, Hindutva
“violence has percolated through the entire nation, provoking lynchings, assassinations, rapes,
beatings, imprisonments, and constant abuse on airwaves and social media by Modi’s
cheerleaders” (Deb). Since his re-election in 2019, the BJP has aggressively pushed their
pernicious ideology even more, through the abrogation of Section 370 and 35A in the state of
Jammu and Kashmir, which has worsened the existing brutal military occupation of Kashmiri
Muslims by taking away their special status and imposing a communications ban. In December
of 2019, the Modi government also implemented the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA),
banning Muslim asylum seekers from getting citizenship in Inidia, inciting mass protests. This
will be expanded upon in Chapter Four in an analysis of how the Modi regime has harnessed
drone surveillance to control protesters.
In 2018, four million Bengali Muslims from Assam were stripped of their citizenship, all
on the basis of identity papers from 1951. Through the National Register of Citizens (NRC), the
Indian government separates ‘illegal citizens’ from ‘genuine Indian citizens’. This process of
identification relies on ‘legacy data’, which is a roll of names of households based on census
returns, along with proof of relation to that said relative, in order to establish citizenship. This
biographical information of all households in Assam are then digitized into a ‘legacy code’, that
is available on a searchable online database. It has been proposed that this information will be
linked to ones’ Aadhaar number in order to qualify the legality of Indian citizenship. In February
of 2020, in the midst of the ongoing pogroms against Muslims in India,6 the UIDAI found that
6

In February of 2020, United States president Donald Trump visited India, coinciding with the ongoing protests of
the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). During this time, Hindu mobs targeted Muslims in North East Delhi,
unleashing a pogrom which killed over 40 people and injured over 200, most of whom were Muslim (Kamdar).
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127 people in Hyderabad were "illegal immigrants who were not qualified to obtain an Aadhaar
number". In its statement, the UIDAI included that "the Supreme Court, in its landmark decision,
has directed the UIDAI not to issue Aadhaar to illegal immigrants" (Sudhir).
The use of biometric and biographical data that is stressed in the NRC on behalf of the
Indian government indicates their desire to uphold the ‘purity’ of the Indian citizen, which reifies
systemic Islamophobia. This is fundamental to Hindutva, and defies the notion that India is a
secular nation. The NRC website advertises its innovative technological techniques as something
to be celebrated for the future of the nation-state. Rafiul Ahmed writes, however, that this
“...newly applied electronic process being distantly invisible and little understood by ordinary
people have penetrated the last traces of the human body without their knowledge. Such
‘dataveillance’ obscures human biology and genetics, by fetishizing them into an algorithm in
the service of the modern state”. Furthermore, the government uses the genealogical nature of the
NRC seeks to create a ‘criminal’ on the basis of biometric and biographical data. These
surveillance tactics mirror the use of the fingerprints to criminalize Indians during the time of
British colonialism. As Ahmed writes, “the need of such a technique didn’t go away with India’s
independence from colonial rule. Invariably, postcolonial Assam was on the lookout for a
technique to supplement the barbed wires in the Assam-Bangladesh border with newer
technology. The NRC can thus be viewed as a progression from these earlier techniques. Its
multiple utility is realized from its potentialities to detect lies in order to apprehend recidivists”.
As per the expanding function creep7 of the UIDAI, Aadhaar has extended to the NRC, using the

7

A ‘function creep’ can be defined as what happens when a technology that is introduced for a certain purpose is
expanded beyond its original intent. While Aadhaar was meant to be an infrastructure that helped the poor claim an
identity to avail of welfare benefits, it has since expanded and has been made necessary for several other institutions,
including the NRC (Ramanathan).
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biometric data of those excluded from the NRC in Assam to later prevent them from applying for
an Aadhaar number or accessing welfare benefits in other parts of India (“People’s Tribunal”).

c. Building surveillance through caste supremacy:
In the book Gandhi and Philosophy: On Theological Anti-Politics, p hilosophers Shaj
Mohan and Divya Dwivedi examine the prolific views of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who is
often valorized by the West as a non-violent and anti-colonialist hero. This mainstream
reputation, however, has obscured his pernicious positions on caste and race. Gandhi wrote, “I
detest secrecy as a sin” which establishes a covenant that “...seeks to bring about the elimination
of the sin of secrecy by demanding of men that they lead their inner lives and outer lives as if
under the watch of a judge of morals”. In a text titled “The Sin of Secrecy”, Gandhi urges his
followers to “avoid even thinking thoughts we would hide from the world”. The authors examine
Gandhi’s specific positions on the relationship between the state, privacy, and security. Dwivedi
and Mohan extrapolate that “the state in which all men think only clean thoughts succeeded upon
by clean speech and act would be determined by the notion of cleanliness. Cleanliness has
several determinations, including that of caste and race”.
Gandhi’s use of “secrecy as sin” and cleanliness justifies surveillance measures and
restrictions, and can be understood within the larger system of caste supremacy and caste
apartheid, which associate cleanliness and purity with Savarnas, or dominant castes, and
untouchability with Dalits. As Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar writes, in Annihilation of Caste, “It is
said that the object of caste was to preserve purity of race and purity of blood”. The concepts that
are inherent to caste apartheid and Brahmanical hegemony is the binary of pollution and
cleanliness. Purity is seen as the ultimate enforcer of social control and physical violence given
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that it penetrates every aspect of Indian society, even to this day. According to Gandhi, if people
had nothing to hide or were not engaging in sin, then they would not have anything to worry
about under a surveillance state. A former employee of Project Insight, a private firm hired by
the income-tax department to organize information for Aadhaar, employs a similar argument:
“Ok, you’re going to be going through everyone’s social-media platforms, integrating various
online identities that you might have, your digital footprints”. After the report asked if that was
an invasion of privacy, he said: “No, if you’re an honest person you have nothing to worry
about” (Thaker). The surveillance state as enforced by Hindu nationalism, therefore, is based on
reifying the violence of caste apartheid, using these notions of pollution, cleanliness, purity, and
Gandhi’s “sin of secrecy” to justify the surveillance state.
Caste is intimately tied to how Aadhaar is deployed. Because the Aadhaar Bill8, passed in
2016, defines biometric information as photographs, fingerprints, iris scans, or “any other such
biological attributes of an individual as may be specified by regulations”, the fear is that the
UIDAI can widen this definition in the future and include race, religion, and caste
(Thikkavarapu). One case brought to the Supreme Court challenging Aadhaar stated that
Aadhaar “has led to needy people being excluded from welfare programs. One case suggests it
could have resounding implications for people of lower castes who could face discrimination if
biometrics are matched with surnames and addresses — often indicators of caste” (Doshi).
Although the legal counsel for Aadhaar has insisted that Aadhaar does not record the caste,
religion, or race of individuals (Rajagopal), recent security breaches indicate otherwise. In April

8

The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act was passed by the
Lok Sabha in 2016. While the statutory authority of the UIDAI was established in 2009, the Aadhaar Act officially
provided legal backing to Aadhaar.
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of 2018, a security breach revealed a data leak on the government website, which had
information of an Aadhaar-based database that listed individuals’ religion and caste information
(Thaker).
Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas describe the concept of biovalue as the value we come to
recognize about our bodies: they give us the legitimacy of citizenship, access to welfare, a sense
of authentic belonging within particular families, ethnic groups, or clans (440). If caste is
embedded within Aadhaar, what implications does the perceived essentialism of identity, coded
into ‘neutral’ machines and algorithms, recall about the historical systems of eugenics and
scientific racism that are based on the concepts of the ‘pure race’ and the ‘impure race’? Aadhaar
becomes a conduit through which the pernicious social order of the caste system becomes
solidified through the cultivation of biovalue.
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3. Biometric Surveillance: Cultivating Biometric Assemblages Through Aadhaar
Aadhaar, schematically developed in 2009, failed to win legislative backing in 2011.
Representatives of the BJP initially opposed Aadhaar in 2011, mostly on the basis of opposing
the Congress-led government under Manhoman Singh. By the time Modi was elected in 2014,
however, journalist Shankkar Aiyar notes that Modi met with R.S. Sharma, an officer of the
Indian Administrative Service and the UIDAI’s first director-general, and Nandan Nilekani, the
former chairman of UIDAI. Modi was swayed by the prospect of having Aadhaar-linked
biometric systems to track attendance at all central government offices. The same party who had
opposed it three years earlier was now championing it under Modi’s vision for a Digital India9
with the party officially having jurisdiction over it in 2016 when the Aadhaar Act passed.
Aadhaar10 is a 12-digit unique-identity number issued to Indian residents through
collecting their biometric data, which includes fingerprints, retina scans, and facial scans, along
with their demographic information, which includes the resident’s name, address, gender, and
age. It is the biggest biometric database in the world, with over 1.2 billion enrollments - 90% of
India’s population. The data collected for Aadhaar is done through the Unique Identification
Authority of India (UIDAI), a statutory authority established in 2016. In various parts of the
country, the UIDAI has set up enrollment c amps, often run by private agencies, in order to
collect this information. Following enrollment, the data is transmitted online to the UIDAI

9

Digital India is a campaign launched by the Modi regime in 2015, with the attempt of assimilating the Indian
population into a digital infrastructure; Aadhaar, and its biometric digital technologies being a key facet of the
campaign.
Throughout this paper, I use the term Aadhaar, but it is important to note that Aadhaar and Unique Identity
Number (UID) are used interchangeably.
10
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headquarters in New Delhi, where the data is checked against the database of the entire
population. If the data does not match an existing entry in the database, an Aadhaar number and
card is issued to the resident (Sarkar 7). Aadhaar marks a shift from prior forms of identification
that were availed through affiliation to an institution or attestation from an authority body as it
now recognizes the body as the most essentialized form of identification.

a. Understanding the biometric assemblage and the body as data:
Through this shift in mechanisms of identification, the UIDAI’s propaganda champions
Aadhaar as a way to assimilate into Modi’s Digital India and divorces itself from reliance on
political institutions to verify identity. Technology enables the UIDAI to create a scalable
platform for identification that could indisputably corroborate personal identity. Instead of
relying on individuals to identify themselves as a facet of agency and autonomy, the state has
taken on the responsibility of verifying that someone is who they say they are by essentializing
identity through the body and biometric features. This process requires no participation from the
subject at all as it reduces recognition and identity to a perceived categorical certainty. While this
propaganda is predicated on an apolitical, ideologically-neutral agenda, the use of biometrics,
especially by an ethno-nationalist governing body, is, in fact, deeply political: “In practice,
counting people, governing populations, allocating resources, granting rights and encoding duties
are always deeply political processes” (Rao and Nair 470). As surveillance theorist Marc
Andrejevic notes: “Neutrality is the ruse of the algorithm” (Dubrofsky and Magnet xiii). I argue
that contrary to these claims of objectivity, Aadhaar is fundamentally shaped by social processes
and functions through biopolitical control. Coding the body as data in the eyes of the nation-state
is inherently a political process. Specifically, Aadhaar can be understood as a biometric
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assemblage, a dynamic process through which its significance is materialized through the flows
and interactions of various institutions, systems of domination, practices, and discourses.
Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson introduce the concept of the surveillant assemblage,
a foundational shift in prior discourses in surveillance, which largely focused on Foucault’s
concept of panoptic surveillance. Instead of seeing the biometric body as essentialized and static,
the surveillant assemblage helps us understand how, through biometrics, human bodies are
abstracted from their territorial settings, and reassembled in different settings through a series of
data flows, creating a decorporealized body—a data double. When applying this theory to
Aadhaar, it is clear to see how information, social processes, technology and the human body
interact, creating a data double that is able to be tracked, commodified, managed, and controlled
(Shephard 5). Aadhaar gains its meaningfulness, not through the Unique Identity Number itself,
but through the biometric assemblage associated with it. Aadhaar unites the biometric
assemblage by bringing together forms of welfare distribution and security practices. The
expanding function creep of Aadhaar gives the government the ability to link every aspect of an
individual's life, from train tickets, mobile phone numbers, registration to institutions such as
colleges, schools, hospitals, marriage, and bank accounts, all forming a biometric surveillant
assemblage through the Aadhaar number. Ultimately, we can see this as the true essence of
biopolitics, as it incorporates “biometrically verified bodies into the techniques, mechanisms, and
calculations of power” (Jacobsen 467). Elida Κ. U. Jacobsen also notes how the biometric
assemblage of Aadhaar “simultaneously provides identity and produces forms of separation
between the deserving and the undeserving poor: in the logic of the system, those who are
unidentifiable or who refuse to be fingerprinted will ultimately not qualify for welfare support”
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(467). The myth of biometrics as facilitating pure and objective data collection has resulted in a
technological hubris that does not account for failures of the system and the grave privacy
violations and necropolitical consequences of this technological failure.

b. Technological hubris and the necropolitics of Aadhaar:
In this section, I make the argument that biometric surveillance, along with surveillance
in general, does not simply serve to monitor the Indian population, but, as academic Jasbir Puar
eloquently states: “it enforces certain behaviors and certain identities, thereby excluding others”.
Through the creation of biometric assemblages, the Indian state wields power through ways that
impose surveillance as “not only responsive and thus repressive, but also as pre-emptive and thus
productive. Using Puar’s assertion that surveillance is “pre-emptive and productive”, I turn to the
ways in which Aadhaar is specifically ‘productive’. Enrollment in Aadhaar is advertised as
voluntary and only assigns you a unique identification number based on your biometric data for
greater access to welfare schemes. The ‘Strategy Overview’ section of the Government of India’s
UIDAI states:
In India, an inability to prove identity is one of the biggest barriers preventing the poor
from accessing benefits and subsidies...a clear identity number would also transform the
delivery of social welfare programs by making them more inclusive of communities now
cut off from such benefits due to their lack of identification. It would enable the
government to shift from indirect to direct benefits, and help verify whether the intended
beneficiaries actually receive funds/subsidies. A single, universal identity number will
also be transformational in eliminating fraud and duplicate identities, since individuals
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will no longer be able to represent themselves differently to different agencies. This will
result in significant savings to the state exchequer.
Since its inception, Aadhaar was created to be a tool to improve the administrative efficiency of
welfare programs with biometric technology being the basis to that efficiency (Khera). This has
created a technological hubris, however, that assumes technology to be the answer to all social
issues, with no scope for failure or error. It is through this technological hubris that the UIDAI
has no mechanism to report bugs, failures, or security breaches within the system, with the
assumption that biometric technology is a foolproof method of identification. The mass
enrollment of 1.2 billion people with Aadhaar is used by the UIDAI as a sign of the system’s
success, despite the context of the violently coercive ways the biometric assemblage forces
people to enroll in order to survive.
As such, several data breaches associated with Aadhaar have been documented since its
inception. The Centre for Internet and Society, a Bengaluru-based think tank, reported in May of
2017 that the Aadhaar numbers of over 130 million people had been published on government
websites, including their names, bank account numbers, and personal details (Sinha and Kodali).
As discussed prior, Puar describes “biopolitics deployed through its neoliberal guises” as a
capacitation machine, which calls for the “capacitation for some...and the debilitation of many
others”. Surveillance does not affect all people equally, and this is evident in comparing class
anxieties around Aadhaar. While Aadhaar has indeed stripped away the fundamental right of
privacy for many Indians through these data breaches, these realities are negligible compared to
the biopolitical and necropolitical implications that failures within the Aadhaar assemblage and
ecosystem has. Itty Abraham describes this class divide: “These starkly contrasting concerns --
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loss of privacy versus the costs of enrollment -- highlight the class divide that separates the
anxieties of middle-class citizens and civil society from the desires and problems faced by the
informal sector, working class, homeless, and migrant labor” (379). Framing the material
consequences of a system such as Aadhaar within this framework does not dismiss privacy and
data security as a concern, but rather, acknowledges that “privacy is a discursive concern of civil
society and a liberal middle class, even as the costs of misuse or loss of personal information are
universal, non-trivial, and potentially grave” (Abraham 379).
Achille Mbembe defines the term necropolitics, which he describes as the relationship
between sovereignty and power over life and death. I argue that for those who fail to assimilate
within the system of Aadhaar, they are then subjected under the essence of necropolitics: ‘let live
or make die’ (Mbembe 39). Necropolitics presents a management of life for the neoliberal
environment of India in which ‘let live’ represents pure abandonment. If you are abandoned by
the system of Aadhaar for any reason, you can technically live if you have social and economic
ability. If you do not have this mobility, which is the case for the majority of people in India
unable to enroll in Aadhaar, the biometric assemblage abandons you, leaving you for death.
Necropolitics, as opposed to biopolitics, focuses on the control of large populations through the
management of death, rather than life. While those enrolled under Aadhaar are subjected to
biopolitical control, those who are not are subjected to necropolitical control; both encapsulating
the state’s wielding of control over either the populations of life or death.
While legally, no one can be forced to enroll in Aadhaar and submit their biometric data
to the government, the reality on the ground is fundamentally different. The function creep of
Aadhaar keeps expanding and the government and the UIDAI have gradually made virtually all
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social welfare programs that the working-class and poor are dependent on conditional on having
an Aadhaar number. In September of 2013, the Supreme Court, on the basis of several petitions
filed by anti-Aadhaar activists and lawyers following the launch of Aadhaar in 2009, ruled that
“no person should suffer for not getting the Aadhaar card in spite of the fact that some authority
had issued a circular making it mandatory” (Rajagopal). On the ground, however, this has never
materialized. The biometric assemblage of the Aadhaar ecosystem keeps growing; as Usha
Ramanathan writes in the piece, “The Function Creep That Is Aadhaar”, these are only a few
examples of what the function creep has produced:
● Bonded labour will not get rehabilitated till their number is in the system.
● Persons getting out of manual scavenging will have to have their number seeded.
● Women rescued from prostitution are to put their numbers on the database to get
rehabilitated.
● Survivors of the Bhopal gas disasters have to seed their numbers if they are to continue
getting state assistance.
● Persons with disabilities who are given assistance and aid will have to get their numbers
in or else be left out.
● Children will not get their mid-day meals in schools unless their UID numbers are
embedded in the system.
● No adult education without UID.
● No rations without UID.
● No admission to schools without a UID. No hall ticket either.
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● No national award for technology innovation in petrochemicals and downstream plastics
processing industry to incentivise meritorious innovations and inventions in the field of
polymeric materials, products, processes.

Other examples include Liquified Gas Petroleum (LPG) subsidies, pension schemes for the
elderly, train tickets, mobile phone numbers, registration to several institutions, including
colleges, schools, hospitals, marriage licenses, and bank accounts (Malik and Basu). At a Talk
Journalism event held in Jaipur in 2018, Edward Snowden, one of the most famous
whistleblowers in the world who exposed the U.S. National Security Agency’s (NSA) secret
mass surveillance program following September 11th, said that “the framework for mass
surveillance today would look a lot like the Aadhaar system”. Snowden talks about the coercive
nature of Aadhaar “forcing identity on people throughout the country to the point where you
cannot have a child and get a birth certificate unless you provide your Aadhaar number”
(“Aadhaar Is Mass Surveillance System”). For those enrolled in Aadhaar, the linkage of these
systems on the basis of submitting your biometric data poses grave privacy concerns as the
assemblage produces biopolitical control. However, for those who are unable to enroll, or are
subject to the several failures of the technological systems at play, the lack of ability to avail of
any services for basic survival is a result of necropolitics: ‘let live and make die’.

c. Aadhaar wielding control over marginalized populations:
Kathryn Henne notes how “Aadhaar can be used to serve pernicious agendas, such as the
misrecognition of gender minorities or the BJP’s promotion of Hindu nationalist beliefs and its
enabling of religious fundamentalism. The broader implications are important: that the
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introduction of technological tools does not necessarily ensure objective or even outcomes. In
fact, their implementation alone cannot escape or overcome inequality” (Henne 230). In this
section, I bring up case studies of those who Aadhaar has impacted the most: marginalized
communities, which includes the working-class and poor, the elderly, the caste oppressed, queer
and trans communities, women, the disabled, and Muslims. These communities are targeted
through both biopolitical and necropolitical control, based on whether they are assimilated into
the assemblage or are excluded from it.
The claim that biometrics is a ‘foolproof’ method that mitigates the potential for fraud
runs contrary to the material realities of its implementation. Initially, the UIDAI tried to only
collect fingerprints, reminiscent of the colonial tactics described in Chapter Two. However, in a
country where 94% of the working-class population is employed doing manual labor in the
informal sector and where working-conditions are deeply exploitative, fingerprint quality is low
as they are overwhelmingly working with their hands (Rao and Nair 475), as seen in Figure 1.
This limits a large section of working-class and poor people who cannot enroll in Aadhaar, and
similarly indicates the dynamic nature of identity given that biometric features are deeply shaped
by class. This includes the story of Ambwa Kunwar, an 85-year old widow, who could not get an
Aadhaar card due to fingerprint detection issues, which resulted in her being excluded from all
welfare benefits. Biometrics suffers from margins of error that includes false matches and the
inability of recognition. When the government considers biometrics to be irreplaceable,
permanent, and static features, a failure to reconcile with that system can render you an
unperson, a nd therefore subject to necropolitical control.
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Figure 1: An old woman in Gujarat showed the cracked skin of her palms.
Photo credit: Anumeha Yadav
The technological failure of Aadhaar systems has been widely reported on with the most
impacted being caste oppressed, working-class, disabled, poor, and elder Indians living in rural
areas. For instance, several visually-impaired people, such as Sukni Devi, are denied Aadhaar
cards on the basis of not being able to submit iris scans. In 2017, Devi stopped receiving her
pension. Budhni Devi, an elderly widow, “has stopped receiving her pension for 5 years, even
since the payment systems switched from post offices to banks. She didn't have an Aadhaar so
she could not open a bank account. She is partially blind and was told that she can't enrol for
Aadhaar as her retina can't be scanned” (@roadscholarz). In some cases, those who lost their
Aadhaar card could not get it reissued, such as Jugli Devi, whose Aadhaar card was eaten by a
rat.
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Statistics show that an estimated 102 million people do not have Aadhaar, which includes
30% of India's homeless population and more than a quarter of the trans community (Chandran).
Concerns from the trans community stress that Aadhaar makes a person’s gender essentialized as
a static biometric identifier. Trans activists, when appealing to the Supreme Court in 2018,
expressed the ways in which identity documents such as Aadhaar are often conflated to birth
documents, denying the opportunity for them to accurately identify as their actual gender.
Lawyer Jayana Kothari, speaking on behalf of the trans rights activist NGO Swatantra, talked
about how the Aadhaar Act exposes queer and trans people to "violence, surveillance and
harassment by the state and private persons" (“Aadhaar Exposes”). She continues, by arguing
that "Once the personal demographic details of transgenders and sexual minorities is declared, it
exposes them to surveillance, violence, and discrimination including infringement of their
fundamental right to life and liberty, equality, free speech and movement". Because the
institution of Aadhaar insists on a specific person revealing their gender identity, Aadhaar flies in
the face of privacy rights, subjecting the trans community to the violence of scrutiny and
surveillance. Because Aadhaar has been made mandatory for many public and private services,
trans people are more likely to be denied basic rights if they do not have an Aadhaar card,
leaving their livelihood and right to privacy within the hands of the state. In this case, while
enrolling in Aadhaar would make trans communities more vulnerable to harassment,
discrimination and violence through the breach of their privacy and misgendering, indicating
biopolitical control over the right to identify your correct gender. On the contrary, not enrolling
wields necropolitical implications, making an already marginalized community subject to the
lack of basic resources.
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Heteropatriarchy also configures into the biometric assemblage in other ways, bolstering
the reproductive surveillance of cis women. Aadhaar continues to extend its control over all
facets of life in gendered ways with some states requiring an Aadhaar number to avail of
maternity benefits and through tracking women’s pregnancies. In 2019, it was reported that The
Department of Health and Family Welfare was set to track every pregnancy, from conception to
birth, using an Aadhaar-linked unique ID number. Within this new system, every expecting
mother will be given a unique ID number that will be linked to an Aadhaar number with the
hopes of bringing down the maternal mortality rate. As per Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act, “any
individual who is desirous of availing any subsidy, benefit, or service for which the expenditure
is incurred from the Consolidated Fund of India, shall require to furnish proof of possession of
Aadhaar number or undergo Aadhaar based authentication” (Anien). Tara Krishnaswamy, a
social activist, notes that "tracking every woman, including those who are paying for their
expenses in a private hospital, is a violation of the original stated intention of Aadhaar". In April
of 2019, the details of over 480,000 pregnant women in Andhra Pradesh were leaked on the
state’s Women and Child Welfare Department’s website. Amit Bansal of the group Rethink
Aadhaar also notes that tracking women’s bodies through Aadhaar has the potential to reinforce
patriarchal structures of familial pressure, blackmail, and scrutiny.
A feminist praxis of surveillance studies requires us to interrogate the ways to “frame the
reproductive health landscape as more than just an ill-conceived, benign monitoring structure”
(Rathi and Tandon). Because of the push to incorporate reproductive health services within the
Aadhaar ecosystem, this has created it much harder for poorer women, who cannot afford private
health services, to avail of legitimate claims towards abortion and other reproductive services.
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The risk of women who are enrolled in Aadhaar is the potential for a data breach in a patriarchal
society that greatly stigmatizes abortion. Furthermore, the surveillant nexus around reproductive
health creates an environment in which unmarried, disabled, caste oppressed women, along with
members of the queer and trans community, are at risk due to the hyper-visibility that encourages
oppressive scrutiny. This has resulted in grave, life-threatening, and deeply dangerous material
conditions for women, especially working-class and poor women. In February of 2018, a 25-year
old woman named Munni was made to deliver a baby girl outside the emergency ward of the
Civil Hospital in Gurgaon after she was denied access to an ultrasound along with reproductive
and maternal care because she did not have an Aadhaar card: “Nine-month pregnant, Munni was
standing in pain for two hours at the gate of the emergency ward and finally delivered the baby
there at around 12.30pm, claimed her husband. “I was left helpless as my wife was screaming
and shouting in pain” (Pati).
Fatal hunger is also a potential possibility through not having an Aadhaar card; the
government has already made it mandatory for children to produce Aadhaar numbers to receive
their free mid-day meal. If the child isn’t able to do that, they could be denied food (Sharma).
Through a compilation prepared by activist Siraj Dutta, 42 hunger-related deaths have been
documented since 2017, on the basis of being denied access to welfare programs without an
Aadhaar card (Rethink Aadhaar). This has deeply impacted caste oppressed communities, who
are already structurally denied a dignified identity by systems of Brahmanical hegemony. In
2017, it was reported that three Dalit brothers - Narayana, Venkataramma, and Subbu Maru
Mukhri - died of starvation in July near Karnataka's Gokarna town after being denied rations on
the basis of not having an Aadhaar card. Activists found that the Maru Mukhri’s family ration
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card was deleted from the Public Distribution System list because it was not linked to Aadhaar
(Rethink Aadhaar). In 2018, it was reported that J. Indu, a 10-year-old Dalit girl, and four other
Dalit and Muslim students in the fifth standards in Amadagur in Andhra Pradesh, were denied
their scholarships because their names were wrongly spelt on their Aadhaar cards: “My name is
Indu, but my first Aadhaar card made it ‘Hindu’. So I applied for a new card [seeking a
correction], but they made it ‘Hindu’ again” (M).
Even in what is considered a sacrosanct right in a democracy, the act of voting, has
become conditional on the basis of Aadhaar. In December of 2018, several voters in Rajasthan
and Telangana had tweeted that their names were missing from the electoral roles. As reported in
the Huffington Post, “election officials admit that software could have played a role in the
elimination of 2.2 million voters from Telangana's electoral rolls” (Khaira and Sethi). This form
of disenfranchisement through Aadhaar similarly represents the ways in which not having a
verifiable Aadhaar card can render you invisible to the state; an unperson, l eaving you to fend
for yourself as resources are slowly grabbed from your reach. Following this, several people in
Telangana protested.

d. Merging state and corporate power through Aadhaar:
Fascist tendencies are marked by the merging of state and corporate power. While the
government has initially claimed that Aadhaar is a strictly governmental project, Aria Thaker
writes about the extremely worrying “mixing of public risk and private profit”. The non-profit
iSpirit created a set of application programming interfaces (APIs), called India Stack, which are
considered the “building blocks in the software architecture required by many third-party
entities, whether public or private, to use Aadhaar”. In February of 2017, the India Stack Twitter
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account tweeted out a black-and-white photograph of a man facing the camera in a crowded
street (Figure 2). Superimposed on his face was a computer-generated box with his Aadhaar
number, mobile number, data of birth, and address. Above the image, the tweet had the caption:
“Welcome aboard @On_grid team.” India Stack had the picture from the homepage of OnGrid, a
private company that uses peoples’ Aadhaar numbers to perform background checks for
companies hiring workers. OnGrid had just joined a select group of India Stack’s user entities.
Within hours of the tweet being posted it was deleted, as people expressed outrage and disbelief
at what the photo implied. One user tweeted, “Does it mean that Aadhar, PAN, passport etc docs
for a given individual will be linked and available on your server?” (Thaker). While the company
sought to defend their tweet and mitigate the fears surrounding it, the realities of how the
Aadhaar ecosystem interacts with private companies was exposed.
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Figure 2: The contentious tweet revealing privacy vulnerabilities of Aadhaar.

Because a growing number of private services are being linked to peoples’ Aadhaar
numbers, private companies have a lot to benefit from their relationship with the UIDAI and
Aadhaar. This marks the distinct merging of the state and corporate power, resulting in
dangerous consequences. In 2018, it was reported that “a group of 50 companies consisting of
fintech firms, lending companies, verification agencies” had formed a group called the Coalition
for Aadhaar, committed to defending Aadhaar from the appeals of activists and lawyers who
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have expressed sustained concerns about sharing over 1.2 billion peoples’ biometric information
with private corporations with a profit motive (Agarwal). Despite the claims of the government
that Aadhaar is a strictly public institution, the figures associated with the UIDAI suggest
differently.
Nandan Nilekani is a prominent Indian billionaire and the co-founder of the multinational
technology corporation, Infosys. In 2009, Nilekani was appointed as the first chairman of the
UIDAI. Nilekani famously said, “Data has become the new oil. If we can restructure data to
benefit every individual and every business, then we can lead to enormous amounts of activity
and economic growth.” Shoshana Zuboff defines surveillance capitalism as “a new economic
order that claims human experience as free raw material for hidden commercial practices of
extraction, prediction, and sales.” When data is ‘mined’ in a similar way to oil, this profit
incentive violates one’s autonomy, privacy, and livelihood. Although Aadhaar is presented as a
way to collect and use Indians’ biometric data for the public good, the capitalist intent behind it
has furthered the merging of the Indian nation-state and corporations. As Nitin Pai, the director
of the Takshashila Institution, has observed: “There are cases where you have people who have
been involved either in the construction of Aadhaar, the rollout of Aadhaar, the design of
Aadhaar, now working in the private sector”. Nilekani himself, although he is no longer the
chairman of the UIDAI, still “wields immense power in the Aadhaar ecosystem, in both private
and public realms.” Vinod Khosla, Indian venture capitalist, billionaire, and founder of Khosla
Labs, said on a panel discussion about UIDAI: “People often ask me why we started Khosla
Labs. And frankly, one of the simple reasons was that there was great talent available—I told
you I love talent. But they also knew the Aadhaar system. And I said, there’s got to be a bunch of
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opportunities around Aadhaar. So I would highly encourage it. And I do think it’s a really big
opportunity” (Thaker).
Through surveillance capitalism, the neoliberal subject has become a quantified self
meshed into the biometric assemblage. Accumulation of biometric data means that powerful
state and corporate interests are profiting off of, and therefore managing, populations; the
essence of biopolitical control converging with capital accumulation. Within the neoliberal
environment of India, surveillance is dependent on capitalism to sustain its technologies; it is not
surprising that the assemblage of Aadhaar is intimately tied to corporate interests. The rate of
augmenting surveillance parallels Moore’s Law, which observes that the number of transistors in
a dense integrated circuit will double biannually (Moore 83). While Moore’s Law references
technology in a vacuum, the law also applies to understanding the rate of capitalist production in
the technology industry, which lends itself to the fast growth of more sophisticated surveillance
technologies. As Bill Davidow explains, Moore’s Law rightly anticipates that “existing
participatory and involuntary surveillance technologies are proliferating and new ones are being
introduced and becoming more effective every day...low-cost facial recognition will let the
government and retail establishments track us”. In the case of India, Davidow’s reflections
resonate with the recent actions of the Modi regime: introducing the largest widespread facial
recognition technology system in the world (Zaugg).
India's National Crime Records Bureau at the home affairs ministry issued a deadline of
October 11th, 2019 for bids of private technology corporations to create a system for state police
forces to create mass facial recognition technologies. This rings eerily similar to the alliance
between the Third Reich of Nazi Germany and the technology company, International Business
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Machines (IBM). Although these forms of fascism greatly differ based on the temporal context,
it is worth looking at the parallels. In 1933, IBM was contracted to create readable cards with
standardized perforations that involved punch cards with each hole representing an identity
indicator - gender, nationality, occupation, etc - that would eventually give IBM the “opportunity
to cater to government control, supervision, surveillance, and regimentation on a plane never
before known in human history”. IBM instrumentalized Nazi race science, which proclaimed the
Aryan German as the master race, eventually leading to the murder more than 11 million people
(Black 72). In other words, an ethno-nationalist government contracting large technology
corporations to build surveillance apparati in order to assert dominance over a civilian population
has precedence and has the potential to have devastating consequences. In August of 2018, the
UIDAI made the biometric feature of facial recognition necessary to obtain an Aadhaar card. In
the next chapter, I will discuss how facial recognition as a form of biometric data collected
through Aadhaar, has been weaponized to anticipate, suppress, and punish dissent of the
nation-state through drone surveillance, specifically using the case study of the anti-CAA
protests that began in December 2019.
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4. Drone Surveillance: Quelling Anti-Fascist Dissent
Within the expanding surveillant assemblage of Aadhaar, one of the most recent forms of
surveillance added is the rapid expansion of drone surveillance used by security forces across
India. Using the biometric data of facial recognition, Aadhaar has leveraged policing bodies and
other security forces to use drone video surveillance to enforce biopolitical control of those who
show dissent against the nation-state of India, which disproportionately impacts marginalized
communities. While facial recognition exists within the assemblage model of biometric
surveillance, the way facial recognition has been leveraged through drone surveillance merits
older models of analysis, namely Foucauldian theories of power.

a. Theory of the drone:
The emergence of documented cases of drone policing in India in 2013 indicated the
growing popularity of this type of technology compared to more traditional modes of punitive
suppression displayed by police forces. To analyze the use of drone surveillance, I invoke the
theory of Grégoire Chamayou. While Chamayou centers his analysis on armed drones in combat,
his theorization on the logic of the drone is relevant to the ways policing logics have gradually
transformed through the technological apparatus of the drone camera.
Chamayou compares the logic of the drone with the ‘eye of God’: "Its vision is more than
just sight: beneath the skin of phenomena it can search hearts and minds. Nothing is opaque to it.
Because it is eternity, it embraces the whole of time, the past as well as the future. And its
knowledge is not just knowledge. Omniscience implies omnipotence (37).” Chamayou explains
the several principles that apply to drone logic:
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1. The principle of persistent surveillance or permanent watch.
2. The principle of a totalization of perspectives or a synoptic viewing.
3. The principle of creating an archive or film of everyone's life.
4. The principle of data fusion.
5. The principle of the schematization of forms of life.
6. The principle of the detection of anomalies and preemptive anticipation.

Following these principles, the functionality of the surveillance drone used by police forces in
India exhibit the principles of the totalization of perspectives, creating an archive or film of
everyone’s life, and data fusion. The body of the drone goes hand-in-hand with the concept of the
biometric assemblage by using facial recognition for identification in order to preempt, suppress,
and punish dissent.

b. Operation Green Hunt and Modi’s Hindutva terror:
In military parlance, unarmed drones are known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
armed drones deployed within a warzone are referred to as unmanned combat air vehicles. India
used armed drones in 1999 during the Kargil War with Pakistan; its usage has increased with the
geopolitical and arms coalition with Israel, who has provided India with both armed and
unarmed drones through a series of deals. India’s usage of armed military drones has influenced
the usage of unarmed drones by police departments, who have begun to use drones for the
purposes of aerial surveillance of zones of social unrest. A few of the first documented uses of
drones by police departments date back to 2013, where Israeli-made surveillance drones were
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deployed in a limited capacity over Maoist-Naxalite regions on the borders of Andhra Pradesh,
Chattisgarh, and Odisha (Vudali). These surveillance drones were meant to collect anti-Maoist
intelligence but failed to do so due to the dense forests. These surveillance expeditions were part
of Operation Green Hunt, which describes the ‘all-out-offensive’ operation by Indian
paramilitary forces against the Naxalites. Operation Green Hunt is still active till this day. The
Naxalites are a predominantly Adivasi (Indigenous) movement that emerged as part of an armed
communist movement meant to counter the razing, exploitation, extraction of land and
displacement of millions of people caused by the liberalization of India’s economy. In the eyes
of the Indian government, the Naxalites are considered ‘terrorists’ as they dare to push back and
resist the violence of the Indian nation-state. The Indian government’s use of drone surveillance
allows them to collect intelligence in order to ultimately eliminate them. Since then, the
emergence of military apparatuses within police departments in urban areas demonstrates how
drone surveillance threatens marginalized communities based on both identity and dissent.
In 2014, surveillance drones were also used in Trilokpuri, a constituency of Delhi and the
epicenter of the Sikh genocide in 1984 under Indhra Gandhi of the Congress Party. Trilokpuri is
a resettlement colony that is made up of families who were survivors of the violent
slum-cleaning efforts by Congress during the Emergency. Trilokpuri is made up of primarily
Muslims and Dalits who were displaced and resettled in 1976. While most Muslim families were
displaced from demolitions that took place at the Turkman Gate in Old Delhi, most Dalit families
were evacuated from Mandir Marg in central Delhi (Kidwai 14). In 2014, communal riots, fueled
by the election of Narendra Modi, were exacerbated by the Delhi police taking up
pepper-spraying drones, instead of their traditional brutalizing methods of lathi charging
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(“Trilokpuri Clashes”). Yashasvi Yadav, the senior superintendent of police in Lucknow
commented, "The drones have been tested in controlled conditions. They have been very
successful and will be used by the Lucknow police whenever there are violent protests or mob
attacks.” As Kidwai reported in 2014, “For the first time, drones were deployed by the police to
scan terraces for such material and they claim this method provided them much assistance in
conducting search operations”.

c. Anti-CAA protests:
The danger of the drone’s relationship to the surveillant assemblage was most evident
during the anti-CAA protests that began during December of 2019. The protests began as a
response to the implementation of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of 2019, which allows
all religious minorities except Muslims to find refuge in India through a fast-track citizenship
process. The CAA, building upon the existing surveillance frameworks embedded in citizenship,
is one that bolsters the agenda of Hindu nationalism: the ethnic cleansing of Muslims.
Additionally, the CAA has deeply biopolitical implications for other minorities, namely Dalits,
Kashmiri Muslims, Adivasis, women, and queer and trans communities. These communities
stood on the frontlines of mass protests against the CAA, and have been disproportionately faced
with police brutality, detainment, Hindu mob violence, doxxing, and mass surveillance.
During the protests in Delhi on December 19th, 2019, the “ Delhi police used a drone to
keep a watch on protesters as they gathered to march against the amended citizenship law, from
Red Fort in Old Delhi to Shaheed Park near ITO, on Thursday” (Press Trust of India). The Delhi
police used aerial surveillance in the Seelampur area and in Mayur Vihar to identify what they
term as “miscreants’. As quoted by the senior police officer of the Delhi Police Station: “Drones
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are used to record happenings and in case of massive law and order situations, where things go
out of hand, the recordings help to identify those who cause a situation to go out of hand.” This
rationale is common within almost all instances of drone usage by police forces in India. On
December 27th, drone surveillance was used in New Delhi once again at a march led by
protesters of the Bhim Army, starting from Dargah Shah-e-Mardan in Jor Bagh. The Bhim Army
is a Ambedkarite Dalit organization led by Chandrashekar Azad, who was arrested under the
National Security Act. The evidence used by the prosecutor was collected through the drone
footage which showed “Chandrashekhar Azad making inflammatory speeches during the
massive CAA protest in December” (Mathur and Sharma). In Mumbai, it was reported that on
December 19th, 2020, “local police, Riots Control Police (RCP), Quick Response Teams (QRT),
State Reserve Police Force (SRPF) would deploy drones and CCTV at the protest against the
Citizenship Amendment Act.”
In response to the heavy usage of drone surveillance, the Internet Freedom Foundation
(IFF), a non-governmental organization that conducts advocacy on digital rights and liberties in
India, wrote to the Office of the Director General of Civil Aviation to outline the threat that
drone usage poses to civil rights of privacy (“The DCGA”). While the theoretical frameworks of
drone surveillance outlined by Chamayou indicate their dangerous biopolitical implications,
those implications rarely translate into actionable legal frameworks that bring bodies of injustice
to justice. Legal frameworks that are in place are frequently violated and rarely held accountable
for those violations as well.
The IFF described the risk that drones pose to protest from civil populations as follows:
“Quite often these are deployed across peaceful protests to record the movements of people and
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pose a risk to their privacy. They also may fly close to crowds threatening injury and causing
anxiety. These concerns made us look more closely as to their legal framework and to our shock
we discovered that these are completely illegal” (“The DCGA”). The laws violated, cited by the
IFF, include the Aircraft Act of 1934 and the Aircraft Rules of 1937, which “make better
provision for the control of the manufacture, possession, use, operation, sale, import and export
of aircraft” (“The Aircraft Act, 1934”), which provide the Director General of Civil Aviation
(DGCA) with exclusive power to regulate drone usage in India. They also regulate the specific
makes and models of drones that are allowed to be used. Several drones that violate these rules
were spotted by protesters throughout the duration of the protests.
The violations outlined by the IFF are twofold: 1) the violation of the fundamental right
to privacy and 2) the violation of DGCA rules. The first point harkens back to Chamayou’s
framework that highlights the moral concerns that drones present; mass surveillance violating the
basic tenets of human autonomy. As the IFF states, “It is important to consider that the privacy
right under the judgement applies even in public spaces. Such acts of mass surveillance need to
be done only on the basis of legality, necessity and proportionality”. The point raised by IFF uses
the constitutional guarantee of freedom for each citizen to be the basis of the right to privacy and
the subsequent violation of privacy by drone surveillance. The main concern lodged by the IFF is
on a technical point, which refers back to the violation of the DGCA rules, which identifies the
type of drone being used by the Delhi Police as that in violation of the law: “Notably, the Delhi
police has been found to be using drones manufactured by DJI systems (specifically DJI
Phantom) which are beyond these permitted categories as per the Reply to Question No. 356 as
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referred above” (“The DCGA”). Ultimately, the request of the IFF was to "cease the use of
drones by police departments...and their subsequent confiscation".
Drone surveillance, through the biometric assemblage, makes use of facial recognition
extracted through Aadhaar. The combination of India’s newly developed sophisticated facial
recognition system along with the proliferation of drones recording protesters’ activity indicates
deeply entrenched forms of surveillance and punishment on the basis of tracking protesters’
faces. As Aria Thaker observes, “Administrators and police departments are using individual
Aadhaar numbers to consolidate citizen data scattered across disparate government departments,
allowing for the creation of detailed personal databases.” Through drone footage, facial
recognition technology is used to identify a protester, which automatically leads the police to a
network of information about a specific person, piecing together a data double as referenced in
Chapter III, and using both punitive measures or a necropolitical blockage of social welfare
institutions on top of a clear breach of privacy and autonomy.
Who will suffer the most material detriment of being surveilled? It becomes clear that
marginalized communities are most at risk. Drones are being used to track protesters within one
of the largest mosques in India - the Jama Masjid. Echoing Chamayou’s principles of drone
logic, the principle of the schematization of forms of life and the principle of the detection of
anomalies and preemptive anticipation, drone surveillance of Muslim communities places of
worship show Hindutva has the technological apparati to document those they consider ‘deviant’
to the nation-state. This not only enables them to punish these minorities for dissent, but can also
detect anomalies and cultivate pre-emption of movement and behavior. We see this in drone
surveillance as it applies to protests organized by the Bhim Army. There is a clear oppressive
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scrutiny applied to Dalit-Bahujan communities, whose underlying agenda is to destroy the caste
system that relegates them as inferior.
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5. Anti-Surveillance Futures
While the dangers and violence of surveillance can be rendered as overwhelming, we
must turn to the overwhelming potentiality of anti-surveillance futures. In this section, I
undertake a more generalized approach to discussing anti-surveillance ideologies, endeavors,
organizations, and practices. I am inspired by Simone Browne’s conception of dark
sousveillance, which she describes as “a way to situate the tactics employed to render one’s self
out of sight, and strategies used in the flight to freedom from slavery as necessary ones of
undersight” (21). Though I intend to avoid homogenizing the temporal framework and
subjectivity of blackness within transatlantic slavery, I use Browne’s theorization behind dark
sousveillance as it stems from “an imaginative place from which to mobilize a critique of
racializing surveillance, a critique that takes form in antisurveillance, countersurveillance, and
other freedom practices” (21). Browne continues, seeing dark sousveillance as something that
“plots imaginaries that are oppositional and that are hopeful for another way of being”. Similarly,
I channel Browne’s desire for “another way of being” and extend that to anti-surveillance tactics
that take into account the intersecting systems of domination of class, caste, gender, sexuality,
and ability.

a. Embracing sousveillance:
Referencing Fuchs’ conception of neutral surveillance i n Chapter I, Steve Mann uses the
term veillance to describe a “neutral form of watching” (1). Thus, surveillance can literally be
translated to “watching from above” (closely mirroring the affective performance of drone
surveillance). Mann coins the term sousveillance to mean “watching from below”, an active
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inversion of the power relations that surveillance inherently comprises (1). Steve Mann’s
Veillance Plane plots an 8-point compass model of veillance directionalities:

Figure 3: Steve Mann’s Veillance Plane

As seen by Figure 3, Mann’s Veillance Plane conceptualizes surveillance and sousveillance as
“orthogonal vectors” in which surveillance is on the x-axis (“S”) and sousveillance on the y-axis
(“s”). Here, “the amount of sousveillance can be increased without necessarily decreasing the
amount of surveillance” (6). Residing in the middle of these two axes lie concepts that can be
interpreted as a mixture of both planes. This includes univellance, where one party records a
telephone conversation (as opposed to a third-party party in power, such as the phone company
itself), which leans more towards sousveillance, and McVeillance, when a company or
establishment prohibits people from recording portions of the establishment, but records them
through CCTV surveillance.
Most forms of drone surveillance from December 2019 to present-day have been
documented through Twitter, as seen by Figure 4, 5, 6, and 7. I consider these forms of citizen
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journalism as sousveillance. Mann expands on its definition: “One way to challenge and
problematize both surveillance and our acquiescence to it is to resituate these technologies of
control on individuals, offering panoptic technologies to help them observe those in authority.
We call this inverse panopticon sousveillance, from the French words sous (below) and veiller
(to watch)”. Sousveillance, as defined by Mann, can be a “form of tactical media activism”,
along with a proven mode of resistance. Sousveillance allows for the gaze, backed by regimes of
power and control, to be turned back in order to surveil those in authority. The acts of
sousveillance by protesters through tweets allowed for the IFF to identify that police departments
were using a specific brand of drone -- the DJI Phantom -- which is against the law as defined by
the Aircraft Act of 1934 and the Aircraft Rules of 1937. Ultimately, these acts of sousveillance
helped the IFF write to the Office of the Director General of Civil Aviation demanding urgent
action.
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Figure 4: Drone spotted in New Delhi on December 27th, 2019 by Twitter user
@kruttikasusarla.

Figure 5: Documented usage of the DJI Phantom drone by the Delhi Police
by Twitter account @ZeeNews.
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Figure 6: Drone surveillance used in Chennai during a protest of 20,000 on February 18th,
2020, captured by Twitter user @ie_chennai.

Figure 7: Drone surveillance used outside the Jama Masjid in New Delhi on December 20th
captured by Twitter user @zafarabbaszaidi.
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b. Social mobilization against Aadhaar:
Since the introduction of Aadhaar, there have been protests, petitions, court appeals, and
more forms of direct action to oppose the coercive and biopolitical mechanisms of Aadhaar that
impact the most marginalized people. Although there have been several challenges to Aadhaar,
in 2018, the Indian Supreme Court upheld the use of Aadhaar. In 2017, however, the Supreme
Court ruled that citizens have a fundamental right to privacy, despite the BJP arguing that
privacy is not, in fact, an inalienable right. Despite these legal contestations, Aadhaar continues
to materially and detrimentally impact the most marginalized Indians. The Right to Food
Campaign (RFC), a movement started in 2001, is an “informal network of organizations and
individuals across local and national levels, which targets the state for entitlement to food.”
Understandably, Aadhaar has been the target of their activism, given that the state has made it
increasingly mandatory to have an Aadhaar card in order to avail of social welfare benefits,
which has resulted in several hunger-related deaths.
In the southern state of Karnataka, RFC organized protests amongst families of the "rural
and urban poor" in 2017 (Bansal). The families described how they have been deprived of access
to ration food grains because of a variety of reasons: they have enrolled but have not received
their Aadhaar details, the inability to link Aadhaar up with specific government systems, and
Aadhaar fingerprint-reading machines failing to recognize the worn-down fingerprints of
laborers and the elderly, as talking about in Chapter 3. Karnataka spokesperson Neeliah of RFC
said: “Aadhaar has become a tool in the hands of the state to exclude people from accessing even
basic entitlements and services,” he said. “Despite repeated court orders, Aadhaar has been
linked to every aspect of people’s lives from school admissions, scholarships, insurance policies,
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to open Bank Account, Provident Fund, LPG cooking gas, to even assistance for Tuberculosis,
and HIV drugs, disaster relief, and death certificates.” During these protests, several groups such
as Jagruta Mahila Okkuta, Bandhu, GRAKUS, Navajeevan Mahila Okkuta, Jagrut Mahila
Sanghatan, Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan, Slum Jan Andolana Karnataka, Milana, and
PUCL Karnataka came together to submit a memorandum to the Karnataka Chief Minister in
Bangalore. During this action, RFC launched a state-level signature campaign to “de-link”
Aadhaar from all social security programs in conjunction with the group Rethink Aadhaar
(Bansal). On September 18th, RFC Karnataka organized a protest called “Museum of the
Aadhaar Abused, Fossilised Citizenship”, at the town hall in Bengaluru: “Affected people from
Chintamani, Belgaum, Chennapatna, and Bangalore posed as museum exhibits holding plaques
narrating their stories.” This included stories of affected people such as Nagalakshmi, a woman
living with HIV and AIDS. As Nagalakshmi recites: “Antiretroviral treatment is our lifeline but
today we need to link Aadhaar to avail of this facility! I did not want to reveal my HIV status but
Aadhaar is going against my right. I oppose Aadhaar as it intrudes into my privacy” (Bansal).
In Jharkhand, a protest was staged on July 13th in 2018 at Jharkhand Bhavan by RFC to
protest against Aadhaar-based biometric authentication (ABBA) due to the deaths by starvation
due to being denied food rations for not having an Aadhaar card after the public distribution
system made it mandatory. The Campaign submitted a memorandum to the resident
commissioner which outlined the issues in relation to the Public Distribution System in
Jharkhand and highlighting the "lack of government action on growing attacks on the right to life
in Jharkhand”, ultimately demanding the delinking of Aadhaar from all public services. The
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memorandum noted that over the past two years, 13 people had died from hunger due to
Aadhaar-related failures (Bhatnagar).
In January of 2018, several different organizations, such as RFC, Rethink Aadhaar,
AISA, and Satark Nagrik Sangathan organized a “Month of Action Against Aadhaar”, with
protests being held in Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Jharkhand, and Bihar. Several people spoke
about how the failure of Aadhaar has personally impacted their lives, ranging from the machine
not being able to recognize fingerprints, children being unable to be added to ration cards, and
the lack of pensions for the elderly. Together, they said: “We stand together and say NO2UID,
no to surveillance, no to starvation deaths, no to tech failures, no to human rights violations, and
no to the coercive UID system” (“January 12”).
Social mobilization and direct action have also carried on into 2019. In February of 2019,
workers from the MNREGA Mazdoor Union and Mahila Chetna Samiti Sangathan protested in
Varanasi as they were denied rations due to their fingerprints not being recognized by the
biometric scanners. Their demands included de-linking Aadhaar from systems of food ration and
education systems -- due to both their fingerprints not being recognized and long distances of
two to five kilometers required to walk to the systems to enroll in Aadhaar (“Hundreds of
Labourers”). In March of 2019, hundreds of Adivasi farmers of several villages in Jharkhand
protested against the denial of ration, the use of Aadhaar, and the consistent irregularities in the
Public Distribution System. Similar to other protests before, the demands set forth include
un-linking Aadhaar from the Public Distribution System and making Aadhaar non-mandatory
(“Hundreds of Adivasi Farmers”).
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It is important to highlight the grassroots organizations who are doing anti-surveillance
work on the ground. This includes The Internet Democracy Project (IDP) is an organization
headed by Dr. Anja Kovacs, who undertakes research and advocacy currently focusing on data
governance, surveillance and cybersecurity, and freedom of expression through a gendered lens.
IDP recently launched the website Gendering Surveillance (Kovacs), a set of six essays that
uncover field research about the ways in which surveillance in India enacts gendered violence,
through the mobile bans in northern India, the mass proliferation of CCTV cameras in garment
factories where the workers are majority women, along with examining the rising popularity of
safety apps for women, and how they reinforce the same patriarchal surveillance structures they
seek to work against. IDP also holds workshops centering a variety of pertinent topics, including
Imagining a Feminist Future, Workshop with Mahila Samakhya, Workshop with FAT (Feminist
Approach to Technology), and a Gendering Surveillance Workshop. The campaign Rethink
Aadhaar was formed following the 2016 Aadhaar Act, and seeks to educate people about what
their rights are and includes testament from people impacted negatively by Aadhaar. They also
seek to educate through posters that bust the myths spread by the government about the benefits
of Aadhaar. The Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF) is non-profit organization based in New
Delhi that focuses on advocacy around digital rights, liberties, and surveillance. They regularly
file petitions (such as those mentioned in Chapter Five regarding illegal drone usage) and
undertake advocacy campaigns to defend online freedom, privacy, net neutrality, and innovation
(Internet Freedom Foundation).
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c. Towards the obsolescence of surveillance:
The most prominent critics of Aadhaar advocate for its destruction, as they recognize
how pernicious its core is. As Usha Ramanathan, senior advocate, human rights activist, and
lawyer says: “But many critics of Aadhaar insist that, in light of all the risks, the only safe way
forward is to dismantle the Aadhaar system completely. The UIDAI database “contains all
manner of things, all manner of information about people. It makes people very vulnerable, not
only to breaks into the database per se, but also because of various kinds of links that have been
established through seeding it in different databases. The database plainly has to go” (“Dr. Usha
Ramanathan”). How do we work towards a larger praxis of abolishing surveillance?
Surveillance and surveillance societies advance the neoliberal logics of competition and
individualism in which our actions are predetermined by the assumption that we function
through a zero-sum game. Capitalism completely breaks down systems of trust and cultivates the
notion that everyone is acting through selfishness. As Fuchs says, “surveillance operates with
threats and fear; it is a form of psychological and structural violence that can turn into physical
violence (Fuchs 123).” Toshimaru Ogura, political-economy professor at Toyama University in
Japan, says that surveillance necessarily requires the modern capitalist society to be upheld with
the intention to “mobilize each individual as labor-power and to integrate various subject
identities into a national identity.” Thus, capitalist surveillance states are “rooted in a deep
skepticism of humans” with a “machine fetishism at the core of its worldview”. This assumption
lies in the fact that “human beings lie at the root of uncertainty, that machines are without error”
(275). Having a negative concept of surveillance, therefore, makes “political demands for
participatory, co-operative, and dominationless society that is not only a society where
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co-operative modes of production and ownership replace classes and the exploitation of
surplus-value, but also a society where care and solidarity...substitute surveillance” (Fuchs 114).
Fuchs urges us to question the notion that “domination is a universal characteristic of all
societies and all social systems.” Socialism lies at the heart of anti-surveillance, as it necessarily
implies the destruction of the surveillance state as we cultivate systems of solidarity and
sympathy.
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Epilogue: Surveillance in the Time of COVID-19
Still in the midst of mass protests against the CAA, NPR, and NRC, along with an
actively genocidal pogrom against Muslims, COVID-19 started making inroads amongst
residents in India. Although the first case was reported on January 30th, the government was
convinced that they were only individual cases and that local transmission was not taking place.
Since then, the number of cases has grown exponentially. On March 24th, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi ordered a nationwide lockdown on 1.3 billion people in the country, which had
deeply violent implications for migrant workers. As Brinda Karat notes, “this huge army of
India's labour force was reduced to becoming objects of suspicion, considered as burdens, in
many cases beaten into submission for trying to get home, herded into camps, treated as less than
humans, let alone as equal citizens” (Karat). Under neoliberalism and Hindutva, the BJP has the
blood of thousands of marginalized people on their hands. As discussed in this thesis, these
forms of violence, seen through growing regimes of surveillance have only become more visible
during this pandemic.
On April 2nd, 2020, the Indian government officially launched Aarogya Setu, a mobile
application in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Aarogya Setu tracks real-time movements
of citizens to determine if they have been in proximity to COVID-19 patients. In an official
address to the country, Prime Minister Narendra Modi urged every Indian resident to download
the app. As of April 24th, 2020, the app had over 75 million downloads (Dua). In a similar
fashion to the biometric assemblage discussed above, Aarogya Setu creates a similar assemblage
by cultivating a social graph of a user by tracking everyone they have been close to and
combines this information with existing government databases (Joshi and Kak). When a person
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registers for Aarogya Setu they are required to upload their name, phone number, age, sex,
profession, travel history, and smoking history (Vaidyanathan). On May 2nd, 2020, the Union
Home Ministry made it necessary for private-sector employees, government employees, and
people within a containment zone to download the app.
Though Aarogya Setu does not specifically use biometric surveillance (as opposed to
other forms of surveillance), the framework of the app as a surveillant assemblage holds many
parallels to Aadhaar as a biometric assemblage. While Aadhaar was propagated by the
government as a system that categorically helped the poor, Aarogya Setu is similarly advertised
as a necessary submission of your private geolocational information to the government for the
greater good of defeating the pandemic. While activists have raised major privacy concerns
about the app, there is an even more paradoxical point at play: how can a government make a
smartphone application mandatory when only about 500 million people among India’s 1.3 billion
have smartphones? As Kalyani Menon Sen says, “The ability to maintain 360-degree
surveillance is essential to sustain the image of the state as an all-seeing, all-knowing,
all-powerful protector of the good and scourge of the less-than-good citizen”. While the news
regarding Aarogya Setu is rapidly developing and changing every day, it is clear that the Indian
nation-state has championed the coercion of surveillance, under the justification of protecting the
violence of the nation-state.
This thesis does not even begin to cover all those who have had their livelihood,
autonomy, dignity, and well-being snatched away by the pernicious regimes of surveillance. I
only provide a few case studies of many millions. It is my hope that as we continue to battle this
pandemic, we simultaneously battle the many ills of capitalism and fascism it exposes.
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